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Summary. - Several alarming and largely ignored trends in the size and structure of military 
expenditure of less developed countries (LDCs) have appeared during the past quarter century. 
New, fuller, and better data series permit us to discern four of these recent trends sufficiently 
clearly to call them “stylized facts” of the contemporary development process: (1) LDC defense 
expenditures have been rising as a fraction of GDP; (2) the capital cost component of this 
spending appears to have been rising relative to the operating cost component; (3) the portion of 
the LDC population serving in the armed forces has been increasing; and (4) LDC military wages 
appear to have been rising relative to civilian wages. 
“The cheap defense of nations . gone.” - Edmund Burke 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the rush to examine and cross-examine 
Emile Benoit’s (1973, 1978) conjectures about 
the relationship of military expenditure and real 
output growth in less developed countries 
(LDCs), economists have largely ignored several 
alarming trends in the size and structure of such 
spending over the past quarter century. New, 
fuller, and better data series now permit us to 
discern four of these trends, perhaps sufficiently 
clearly to call them “stylized facts” of the 
contemporary development process: 
(1) LDC defense expenditures have risen as a 
fraction of GDP in the 1970s. For typical LDCs, 
such expenditures were less than 3% of GDP in 
the 1950s and 1960s but rose to 4% by 1980 
(Section 2). 
(2) The capital-cost component of LDC mili- 
tary spending, after falling relative to operating 
costs in the 196Os, rose rapidly in the 1970s. For 
typical LDCs, equipment costs comprised less 
than 12% of total costs over the 1950s and 1960s 
but had reached nearly 20% of total costs by 1980 
(Section 3). 
(3) The fraction of the LDC population serv- 
ing in the armed forces has also risen rapidly in 
the 1970s. On average, in the 196Os, only one- 
third of 1% of the population was in the military; 
by 1980, the percentage had reached nearly one- 
half of 1% (section 4). 
(4) The LDC military “wage” - more pre- 
cisely, the operating (i.e., noncapital) costs per 
warrior relative to civilian income per capita - 
rose dramatically in the 1970s after falling in the 
1960s. Although the evidence differs somewhat 
for different regions of the Third World, the 
typical LDC lowered the relative military “wage” 
by 20% in the 196Os, only to raise it back up by 
that 20% in the 1970s (Section 5). 
The data used are from Nicole Ball (1983) of 
the National Defense Research Institute of 
Stockholm and contain observations from 48 
LDCs for various years over the period 19.50-80.’ 
The regressions reported here are simply time 
trends, with the dependent variables being rela- 
tive deviations from overall own-country means, 
to allow for country-specific factors. It cannot be 
emphasized too strongly that the results tell us 
nothing about determinants, only about trends.* 
They are subject to all the questions always 
raised by the use of such cross-country, cross- 
time data. Nevertheless, the trends are suffi- 
ciently manifest to suggest the above four stylized 
facts. These are derived and discussed, in turn, in 
Sections 2-5, and the relationship between the 
four is examined in Section 6. 
2. TOTAL SECIJRITY EXPENDITURES 
The total national defense expenditures of 
LDCs are not easy to estimate and, once 
‘I am grateful to Lisa M. Grobar for her assistance; to 
the Ford Foundation for financial support of a research 
program on economic issues of national defense in the 
Institute of Public Policy Studies of the University of 
Michigan; and to the referees for comments on an 
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estimated, are not of much interest by them- 
selves. To be compared with those of other years, 
they must be deflated for price changes, and the 
usually available consumer, wholesale, and 
national product price indices may provide poor 
substitutes for the usually unavailable deflator 
for the military bundle of goods and services. To 
be compared with those of other countries, 
they must be converted into a common currency 
(usually US dollars). The problems of using 
official exchange rates or purchasing-power- 
parity estimates are legion, well known, and 
especially serious for LDCs. 
A sensible, if partial, way out of these diffi- 
culties is to calculate total security expenditures 
as a fraction of GDP (hereafter called TSE/ 
GDP). This is only a partial escape from diffi- 
culties for two reasons. One, interpretation of 
the ratio as a relative real resource flow is 
implicitly equivalent to using the same price 
deflator in both numerator and denominator. 
Two, comparison of the ratio across countries or 
across time implicitly assumes an income elasti- 
city of demand for national security of unity as 
the basis for such comparisons. 
The ratio, TSE/GDP, ranges in Ball’s sample 
from barely above zero up to one-fourth (for 
Jordan in the 1970s). It exceeds 10% persistently 
for only two countries, Jordan in the 1970s and 
Saudi Arabia from the mid-1960s to the mid- 
1970s. For the entire sample of 787 observations, 
the mean value of the ratio, TSE/GDP, is 3.0%. 
In an effort to look for trends among countries 
that vary so greatly in their average propensity to 
spend on national security, the percentage devia- 
tion of TSE/GDP from its own-country mean is 
calculated for each country in each year for which 
Ball provides data. These deviations are then 
regressed on time and time squared, for the 
entire sam 
r3 
le, and for each of the three regions 
separately. The regression statistics are shown in 
Table 1; the regression curves are graphed in 
Figure 1.4 
For the entire sample of countries, and for 
countries in the Asian and Latin American 
subsamples, the ratio, TSE/GDP, was stable 
through the 1950s and 1960s falling slightly in 
the 1950s and rising slightly in the 1960s. But it 
rose rapidly in the 1970s with the trend value of 
TSE/GDP reaching 30-35% above country 
means by 1980.5 For a typical LDC, for which 
TSE averaged less than 3% of GDP in the 1950s 
and 196Os, TSE had risen to 4% of GDP by 1980. 
In Africa, on the other hand, the rapid rise in 
TSE/GDP occurred in the 1960s and the ratio 
stabilized in the 1970s. Cross-country regressions 
like these are not the place to locate motivations 
and income elasticities, but one might want to 






Africa Asia America 
Constant 0.286 0.0925 0.294 0.359 
(0.277) (0.311) (0.258) (0.258) 
Year 0.0357$ -0.00968 0.0392$ 0.0469$ 
(0.00485) (0.0137) (0.00832) (0.00703) 
Year squared 0.000759$ -0.001331 0.000917$ 0.00112~ 
(0.000166) (0.000582) (0.000285) (0.000230) 




48 17 14 15 
RZ 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.21 
*The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of TSE/GDP from its 
sample own-country mean. 
_F“Year” is calendar year minus 1980; “year squared” is the square of calendar 
year minus 1980. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 99%. 
Significant at 95%. 
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Figure 1. Regressions of TSEIGDP. 
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note that sub-Saharan Africa experienced not 
only low growth rates in the 197Os, but also lower 
growth rates than those of the 1960s6 
3. MILITARY CAPITAL COSTS 
The disaggregation of military expenditure 
into its current and capital components is not 
always feasible, and the Ball sample falls from 
nearly 800 to 700 observations on this account. 
Not only is the breakdown, in Ball’s words, 
“perhaps not entirely accurate” (Ball, 1983, 
p. 37), but the totals of the two categories do 
not always add to the figure for total security 
expenditure (TSE). The reasons are two: (1) 
some military expenditures are classified by Ball 
as “research and development” (R & D), an 
infrequent and always small category in LDCs; 
and (2) expenditures that “could not be disaggre- 
gated” (p. 37) are included in the totals but not in 
the components. This latter problem is neither 
infrequent nor small, but its effect on the 
regressions turns out to be slight. 
Data problems notwithstanding, Ball’s work in 
dividing military expenditures into “operating 
costs” (0) and “capital costs” (C) is especially 
suggestive for the analysis of LDC security costs. 
Much of the Benoit controversy over the impact 
of military expenditure on growth rates hinged 
on the question whether military expenditure 
deflected resources from investment or enhanced 
private capital formation by productively utiliz- 
ing relatively low-cost resources. While hardly a 
perfect measure of this, the Ball division of 
expenditures gets at this distinction. Military 
capital costs are likely to require scarce foreign 
exchange or skilled labor, while operating costs 
are more likely to reflect the direct use of 
unskilled labor or the acquisition of domestic 
goods produced with relatively less-skilled labor. 
The trends examined here are those in the 
ratio of capital costs to the total of operating and 
capital costs (C/(0 + C)). The importance of 
country-specific factors in this ratio is great - the 
overall sample average of C/(0 + C) is 12%) but 
for Iran in the mid-1970s it rose above 70%, and 
for many other countries it was consistently close 
to zero.’ Because such country-specific factors 
are important, the percentage deviation of this 
ratio from the country’s own mean ratio is 
calculated for each country and for each year for 
which data are available. This percentage devia- 
tion is regressed on time and time squared. 
The trend regressions are shown in Table 2, 
and the regression curves pictured in Figure 2.8 
While the coefficients are significant. the R’s are 
particularly low. Moreover, for these regressions 
(and for none of the others), the estimates 
change dramatically as one removes outlying 
observations.’ In short, the statements of the 
next few paragraphs are tenuous. 
For the entire sample and for each of the 
regions, a U-shaped curve appears. C/(0 + C) is 
above the country average in the 1950s below it 
in the 1960s and again above it in the 1970s. 
LDC militaries were becoming much more 
capital intensive in the 1970s. The typical LDC, 
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*The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of C/(0 + C) from its 
sample own-country mean. 
t“Year” is calendar year minus 1980; “year squared” is the square of calendar 
year minus 1980. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 99%. 
§Omitted (-) if not significant at 95% when included. 
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Figure 2. Regressions of Cl(0 + C). 
which averaged spending barely 12% of its occurred at about the same time that the arms 
military budget on equipment over the 1950s and transfer procedures of advanced countries 
196Os, was spending nearly 20% by 1980. changed. Grants for equipment purchase, which 
The purpose here is to expose stylized facts, do not show up in the LDC capital-cost figures, 
not to explain them, but two observations are gave way to sales. lo Moreover, the transfer of 
irresistible. old, used, or obsolete equipment gave way to the 
First, the upturn in the ratio, C/(0 + C), sale of more expensive equipment embodying 
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new technology. Both of these changes may well 
have contributed to the rise of C/(0 + C) in 
LDCs in the 197Os, quite independently of any 
shift in LDC preferences toward a more capital- 
intensive military establishment.” 
Second, much of the history of the Benoit- 
inspired controversy about the relation of mili- 
tary expenditures and growth rates in LDCs may 
be capable of interpretation through this U- 
shaped trend of C/(0 + C) (Benoit, 1973 and 
1978). Benoit’s data were largely drawn from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, a period when LDCs 
were increasingly incurring operating costs rather 
than capital costs in their military spending. If 
such expenditure did not augment growth, it may 
at least have minimized the adverse effects of 
such spending on growth by drawing on low 
opportunity-cost resources. By the 198Os, when 
the challenges to Benoit’s hypothesis were 
springing up widely, the data were coming from 
the 1970s - when LDC military expenditures 
were increasingly capital intensive. ‘* 
4. MILITARY PERSONNEL 
The importance of national security in a 
country’s labor force allocation is most easily 
measured by the ratio of armed forces personnel 
to total population. Even in this straightforward 
measure, however, there are difficulties. Neither 
the very young nor the very old are eligible for 
military duty - nor, in many countries, are 
women - so total population is not the proper 
denominator for such a ratio. This we ignore for 
simplicity. The other difficulty is that the armed 
forces are only part of the total labor allocated to 
national security. Unfortunately, it will have to 
do since estimates, comparable across countries 
and across time, are not yet collected for the 
numbers of police and other paramilitary 
personnel. 
The ratio of armed forces personnel to popula- 
tion, Pers/Pop, is again calculated as a percent- 
age deviation of each available observation from 
its own-country mean. The regressions on time 
and time squared are shown in Table 3, and the 
regression curves are pictured in Figure 3. For 
all, the trend is significantly upward. For Asia, 
there is little change in the ratio for the 196Os, but 
there is an accelerated upward movement in the 
1970s. 
The average ratio of armed forces personnel to 
population for the entire sample is less than 
0.40% (the ratio reaches as high as 3%, for 
Jordan in the early 1970s). Thus, for a typical 
country, the regression for the entire sample 
suggests that the ratio has risen from 0.30% in 




















0.364 0.543 0.0779 
(0.484) (0.369) (0.263) 
0.0367$ O.lOS$ 0.007921 
(0.00644) (0.0226) (0.00326) 
- 0.00406$ 
- (0.00114) 
212 158 225 
16 12 15 
0.13 0.21 0.03 
*The dependent variable is the percentage deviation of the ratio, (military) 
Personnel divided by (total) Population, from the sample own-country mean. 
t“Year” is calendar year minus 1980; “year squared” is the square of calendar 
year minus 1980. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
$Significant at 99%. 
Bignificant at 95%. 
[(Omitted (-) if not significant at 95% when included. 
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Figure 3. Regressions of PerslPop. 
1960 to 0.47% in 1980 - a rise in the ratio of 
more than one-half over the past two decades. 
5. THE RELATIVE MILITARY “WAGE” 
The military wage rate in LDCs, relative to the 
average civilian wage rate, is not widely collected 
information and so to discuss it requires first a 
search for a reasonable proxy.13 The proxy used 
here, called the relative military “wage” - in 
quotation marks throughout to remind us of its 
inadequacies - is the ratio of military operating 
costs per warrior to the nation’s GDP per capita. 
For (sort of) short, this is written (Op C/Pers)/ 
(GDP/Pop). 
This proxy ratio - technically (Op C/Pers)/ 
(GDP/Pop) but called the military “wage” - 
will be proportional to the true average military 
wage rate if three conditions are fulfilled within 
each of the LDCs considered in the sample: (1) 
the civilian wage share of total national output is 
constant over time; (2) the labor force is a 
constant fraction of the population; and (3) 
military wage payments are a constant fraction of 
total military operating costs.14 A few words on 
each are appropriate: 
(1) Studies of the functional distribution of 
income indicate that the wage share of national 
output changes slowly in most countries. For the 
less than one-third of a century examined here, 
constancy is not an unreasonable assumption. 
But the wage share does rise over longer periods 
of development and may have risen over 1950-80 
as the LDCs in this sample have grown. To that 
extent, movements of the measured military 
“wage” will provide an upwardly biased estimate 
of the true average military wage. 
(2) The ratio of the labor force to population 
also moves slowly for most countries. Its move- 
ment depends on the labor force participation 
preferences of working-age persons and on the 
dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of the numbers 
of the very young and the very old to the total 
population). Examination of these trends indi- 
cates that, for most LDCs, the ratio of labor 
force to population has declined over the past 30 
years, largely due to rapid population growth and 
the resulting growth in the fraction of children in 
the population. This also will mean that move- 
ments of the military “wage” will provide an 
upwardly biased estimate of the true average 
military wage. 
(3) The “operating cost” data collected by Ball 
(1983) include not only wage payments but also 
other noncapital expenditures. To the extent that 
the latter are nonwage income “perks” - such as 
food, housing, clothing, and off-duty transport - 
we want them counted into the true military 
wage. But to the extent that they involve noncon- 
sumption operating costs - such as on-duty 
transport and ammunition - we should exclude 
them, If military wage payments, broadly con- 
strued, are a rising fraction of total operating 
costs, then movements of the measured military 
“wage” will provide a downwardly biased esti- 
mate of the true military wage; if military wages 
are a falling fraction of total operating costs, the 
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“wage” will provide an upwardly biased estimate. 
I suspect the latter tendency but on the basis of 
little real evidence. 
Movements in the relative military “wage” - 
i.e., (Op C/Pers)/(GDPIPop) - probably over- 
state the true movements of average military 
wage rates relative to civilian wage rates. But we 
will proceed on the assumption that the bias is 
small enough to be ignored. Only the quotation 
marks around the word will remain to remind us. 
The trends of the military “wage” are reported 
in Table 4 and displayed in Figure 4, for the 
entire sample and for each of the regions. The 
shapes of these trends across the different regions 
are quite different - for the first time in these 
pages. The relative “wage” has fallen steadily in 
Africa. risen steadily in Latin America, and 
exhibited a steep U-shape in Asia. The entire 
sample shows a milder U-shape. The trends in 
each of the regions are consistent with the 
conjecture that, for the first 20 years or so after 
independence, LDCs reduce the military wage to 
move it from the previous colonial structure 
toward greater consistency with their own post- 
independence wage structures. Then the relative 
military wage begins once again to rise. 
Such a rise in the relative military wage may 
simply reflect increased risk or increased need for 
loyalty. But it does not necessarily mean that the 
same structure of warriors is increasingly well 
paid relative to civilians. At least two other 
explanations leap forth as possibilities. One, the 
LDC militaries are becoming increasingly hier- 
archical. An ever higher ratio of chiefs to braves 
will raise the average wage with no change in any 
of the wage rates. Two, the increased capital 
intensity of the LDC militaries has demanded 
more highly-skilled personnel to operate and 
maintain it. The higher average military wage 
may simply reflect the replacement of low- 
wage unskilled workers with high-wage skilled 
workers. 
6. INTERRELATIONS OF THE TRENDS 
In each of the previous four sections, some way 
of looking at military expenditure in LDCs has 
been examined for trends. In each, evidence of a 
disturbing trend has been uncovered. The ex- 
posure of these possible stylized facts has been 
the main purpose of this paper. 
Here, we will go a bit further, comparing the 
trend regressions of the different sections to 
assess the relative quantitative importance of 
these different aspects of the growing militaries 
of LDCs. To do this, compare the percentage 
growth rate in 1980 implied by each of the 
regressions of each of the previous four sections. 
To calculate the 1980 percentage growth rate of 











Year squaredl 0.00255$ 
(0.000668) 







-0.169 0.158 0.216 
(0.342) (0.525) (0.319) 
-0.0168$ 0.0942$ 0.0217$ 
(0.00495) (0.0345) (0.00420) 
0.00625$ - ( 173) 
185 129 208 
16 12 15 
0.06 0.15 0.11 
*The dependent variable is the percentage deviation from its own-country 
mean of (Op C/Pers)/(GDP/Pop). 
t“Year” is calendar year minus 1980; “year squared” is the square of calendar 
year minus 1980. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 99%. 
80mitted (-) if not significant at 95% when included. 
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Figure 4. Regressions of military “wage”. 
any variable (X), consider the basic trend regres- 
sion (without error term): 
Xi, - Xj 
Xi 
= rio + rir (t-1980) + riz (t-1980)*, (1) 
where i represents country and t time. (For some 
regressions, S2 is insignificant and omitted.) 
Then, 
9 (for r = 1980) = ai& 
and 
(2) 
Xi, (fort = 1980) = (1 + cio)Xi; (3) 
and hence the estimated 1980 growth rate of Xi is 
liil(l + rio). 
These growth rates are shown in Table 5. 
For the entire sample, and for the two regions 
except Africa, the ratio of capital to total military 
expenditures was rising at a rate above 5% per 
annum in 1980. In Asia, the ratio of military 
personnel to population and the ratio of the 
average military “wage” to the overall average 
wage were both rising at rates of 7-g% in 1980. 
Only in Africa was the ratio of total security 
expenditures to GDP falling; elsewhere, this 
ratio was rising at a rate above 3% in 1980. 




Section Entire Latin 







2 2.78% -0.89% 3.03% 3.45% 
3 5.69% 1.65% 5.44% 6.12% 
4 1.90% 2.69% 7.00% 0.73% 
5 4.08% -2.02% 8.13% 1.78% 
*The definitions of the ratios (by section discussed): 
2. TSEJGDP; 3. C/(0 + C); 4. Pers/Pop; and 5. (Op C/Pers)/(GDP/Pop). 
Source: Regressions of Tables l-4. 
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Almost throughout the less developed world, 
these indicators of relative allocations to defense 
were rising at rates of 2% to 8% per annum by 
1980. 
The numbers are high, and alarming, but they 
are only estimates; and the magnitudes of the 
standard errors of the constant terms in the 
regressions mean that they are only very rough 
estimates. One consistency check can be utilized 
to make this warning clear. The four ratios 
examined separately in Sections 2-5 are - as 
alert readers may have noticed - not indepen- 
dent of each other. Algebraic manipulation 
shows that 
TSE 
GDP = (1 - [C/(0 + C)]) ’ 
(4) 
provided that (0 + C) = TSE, as in principle it 
should.15 In fact, (0 + C) is often smaller than 
TSE because expenditures that Ball was unable 
to allocate were included in TSE but neither in 0 
nor in C. Ignoring this, taking logarithms of 
equation (4) and differentiating, one reaches a 
growth rate identity: 
C/(0 + C) 
[l - C/(0 + c)] G(C’(o + c)) 
where G (.) means estimated percentage growth 
rate of the parenthetical ratio. The averages over 
1960-80 of the two sides of equation (5) are 
shown in Table 6. The right-hand side is higher in 
every sample except that for Asia.16 This second 
(i.e., right-hand) estimate in Table 6 of the same 
variable - the average growth rate over 1960-80 
of TSElGDP - reemphasizes the roughness of 
these trend calculations, but offers no suggestion 
that the earlier estimates were too high. 
Table 6. Consistency checks on regression trends 
Sample 
Side of equation (5)* 









*The weight on the final term of equation (5) is 0.1364, 
the overall sample average of the value, for each of the 
four samples. 
Source: Tables 14. 
NOTES 
1. In certain of the regressions below, these data are used and country dummies incorporated, the R2 values 
supplemented with information from the World Bank 
(IBRD, 1983), the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
would run between 0.65 and 0.95 throughout. This 
format focuses narrowly on the time effects. 
1981), and the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA, various years). See Appendix A for 
fuller discussion of the data. 
5. The definition of the independent variables makes 
the constant term of each regression the estimated 1980 
2. Moreover, one cannot naivelv extrapolate these 
value of the dependent variable. 
trends. Although the data for ihe 19sbs are just 
appearing, there are already hints that the trends 
reported here are not abating - Deger (1986), for 
example reports that real military expenditure in LDCs 
rose 20% between 1980 and 1983. 
3. The regional groupings are those selected by Ball. 
She counts also the region “Middle East,” but it 
includes only two countries and is hence not used here. 
The data for these two countries are in the “entire 
sample.” 
4. The horizontal axis of all of the graphs shown here 
is Year-1980, the same time variable that aupears in the 
6. Maizels and Nissanke (1986) speculate on inter- 
regional differences in the determinants of this military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
7. For nearly one-fifth of the observations, the ratio 
was less than 2%. 
8. Notice that the number of observations usable in 
these regressions is fewer than in Table 1. While I think 
we should use all the data available, Appendix B 
reworks all the text regressions using only the observa- 
tions common to all. 
__ 
regressions. The graphs are only shown for the years in 
which there is at least one observation in the rele- 
9. When residuals (for the entire sample) as large in 
vant sample. Notice that the low R* values in this and 
absolute value as 100% are removed, the regression 
subseauent tables occur because the deoendent 
becomes: 
. 
variable is the percentage deviation from the own- C/(0 + c) =-0.195 - 0.0121 (t-1980) - 
country mean. If the actual dependent variable were (0.446) (0.00909) 
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o.OcQ420 (r-1980)2 
(0.000316) 
with standard errors in parenthesis. R’ = 0.00. 
10. Often on soft-interest and deferred-payment 
bases, which also reduce the LDC figures but not by so 
much. 
11. For history and discussion of the move from 
grants to sales and from old to new, see Mosley (1985) 
DD. 140 ff.. Nincic (1982) DD. 144 ff.. Graves and 
Hildreth (1985) Chapter 1, ‘iabrie et al. (1982), and 
KIare (1984) pp. 40 ff. 
12. For a review of the testing of Benoit’s hypothesis, 
see Grobar and Porter (1989). 
13. This entire section refers to the average military 
wage rate. A change in the hierarchical structure of the 
military will change this even with no change in any 
military pay rates. 
14. The first and second of these three conditions 
could be avoided by using some average (say, in- 
dustrial) wage rate as the denominator (in place of 
GDP/Pop). While it is easy to find such series for most 
LDCs, it is not easy to be sure that they are comparably 
calculated across countries. 
15. Almost - remember, R & D expenditures are 
excluded from (0 + C) but not from TSE; but such 
R & D is small in LDCs. See Ball (1983) passim. 
16. A part of the difference can be attributed to the 
failure of (0 + C) to equal TSE. (Ironically, despite 
ever improving LDC data services, Ball experienced 
increasing rath>r than decreasing difficulty over 1950- 
80 allocatine TSE between 0 and C.) The weak fit of 
the C/(0 +-C) regressions accounts’for much of the 
difference. 
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APPENDIX A: THE DATA 
The principal source of the data is Ball (1983). The tive information for total security expenditure in only 
data sources and problems are described fully there and 804 cases.” 
hence need only brief discussion here. The data cover There are two advances made by this data effort - 
48 less developed countries (LDCs) and various years beyond the sheer number of LDCs and years covered: 
over the period 1950-80. These were the countries for 
which “it was possible to obtain data which (1) Security expenditures are disaggregated. The 
covered much of that period” (Ball, 1983, p. 34). In principal disaggregation is between operating (i.e., 
principle, this provides 1,488 observations. on national current) and capital (i.e., equipment) costs. (This 
security expenditures; in fact, Ball presents quantita- distinction is utilized in Sections 3 and 5.) The exact 
LDC MILITARY 
distinction is inevitably fuzzy, especially where rapidly 
depreciating or obsolescing military equipment is 
involved. 
(2) The security expenditure data are checked 
against the other usual sources and as a result presum- 
ably represent the best, qualitatively as well as quanti- 
tatively, that are available to us in the mid-1980s.” 
No doubt there is bias in this expenditure data. First, 
since many LDCs are reluctant to broadcast the 
structure and extent of their military forces, there is 
direct under-reporting, with many expenditures being 
hidden, reported as nonmilitary, or paid for by off- 
budget agencies. Second, military gifts from abroad 
and military purchases with payments deferred are 
rarely included in LDC budget statements.” Thus, the 
Ball figures for security expenditures must be recog- 
nized as lower-bound, at best. 
Whether the downward bias has increased or de- 
creased over time is unclear. Military gifts have become 
less common over the period 1950-80, but low-interest 
deferred payments more common. The trends of 
“hidden expenditures” are quite unknown. The text 
implicitly assumes that the extent of the bias has not 
changed (or has increased, in which case the trends 
uncovered in the text are even more alarming). 
Ball collected the data for each LDC from the 
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country’s own sources. Thus, neither the concepts nor 
the practices of data collection are comparable across 
countries. There is also incomparability across years 
within countries, but to a much smaller degree. Thus, 
all the calculations of the text deal with each variable’s 
percentage deviation from its own-country mean 
(across all the years available for that country for that 
variable). This all but eliminates the risk that the 
estimated trends arise through coincidental appearance 
and disappearance of particular countries in the 
sample. 
The regressions of the text utilize three data series 
from sources other than Ball: 
(1) GDP, from IMF (1981).‘” 
(2) Milifury personnel, from ACDA (various years). 
These data are for armed forces personnel only and do 
not include police or other paramilitary personnel. The 
data are not available before the 1960s. 
(3) Population, from IBRD (1983).” 
In each section of the text, all observations are 
utilized for which all the needed data are available in 
these sources. Data absences account for the different 
number of observations in the regressions of the 
different sections. 
NOTES TO APPENDIX A 
17. “The only criterion used in choosing the data as expenditures by the donor (or lending) country. 
presented . [was] availability” (Ball, 1983, p. 35). From one viewpoint, this treatment is quite correct-it 
avoids global double counting. But even gifts impose 
18. The usual sources are three: (i) the US Arms burdens, and the result here is under-reporting of 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); (ii) the military resource allocarion. 
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS); and 
(iii) the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- 20. Some of the GDP data are taken from other 
tute (SIPRI). Security expenditure data are available sources. Exact source for each country and year is 
from these three sources for comparison purposes since reported in Ball (1983). 
1961, 1972, and 1952, respectively. 
21. Data for Guyana from IMF (1981). Intra- 
19. Such gifts and purchases are, in principle, counted quinquennial figures are interpolated log-linearly. 
APPENDIX B: REGRESSIONS USING ONLY COMPLETE OBSERVATIONS 
There are 804 observations of total security expendi- 
tures (TSE) in Ball’s data set. But in each of the 
regressions performed in the text, some additional 
information on the observations is needed, and gaps in 
the availability of this additional information means 
that the usable number of observations varies from 
section to section. At the extreme, there are only 532 
observations in the regressions of Table 4. 
One feels uncomfortable using different observations 
in the different regressions, even though a lot of 
information is discarded if only those observations are 
used which can be used for all the regressions - barely 
400 of them - half the original sample of TSE 
information. But one would feel even more uncomfort- 
able if the results were highly dependent on the 
vagaries of the sample size. So the regressions for the 
entire sample (of complete observations) were re- 
peated for each of the four ratio variables discussed in 
Sections 2-5. These regressions are given in Table B-l, 
and the regression lines are pictured in Figure B-l. 
Most noticeable is that the regressions never involve 
a significant quadratic time-trend term. But recall that 
all of the data from the 1950s are discarded in this 
reduced sample since no military personnel data are 
available before 1961. Two decades are just not long 
enough to produce significant curvature in the trends. 
But the genera1 slopes are very similar for the 1960s and 
1970s in Figure B-l and in the previous four figures (for 
the “entire sample” regressions). The only exception is 
the military “wage” regression, which here has a slight 
and insignificant negative slope. 
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Table B-l. Regression trends on entire sample of complete observations 
Regression*t 
Military 





0.159 0.311 0.138 -0.0304 
(0.264) (0.720) (0.257) (0.277) 
0.0161$ 0.0316$ 0.0140$ -0.00308 
(0.00254) (0.00692) (0.08247) (0.00266) 
398 398 398 398 
Number of 
countries 
37 37 37 37 
d*/(l+cia) 1.39% 2.41% 1.23% -0.32% 
R2 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.00 
*The dependent variable is in each case the percentage deviation from its own- 
country mean. 
tSee Table 1, note t. 
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Figure B-l. Regressions on sample of complete observations. 
